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10	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAVAPAI	
11	STATE OF ARIZONA,	No. P1300CR20081339
12	Plaintiff,	Div. 6
13	vs.	MOTION TO LIMIT EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING DNA EVIDENCE
14	STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER,	
15	Defendant.	
16		
17		(Oral Argument Requested)
18	Steven DeMocker, by and through counsel, hereby requests that this Court	
19	restrict how the results of DNA testing are communicated to the jury. The State may	
20	seek to introduce DNA evidence, including low volume and partial profiles.	
21	Although many of these profiles only contain results at a few loci and some even	
22	contain alleles that do not correspond to Mr. DeMocker's profile, the State may want	
23	its experts to testify that these results are "inconclusive" or somehow "consistent	
24	with," or "cannot exclude" Mr. DeMocker's profile. Mr. DeMocker requests that the	
25	Court either exclude "inconclusive" results altogether or, in the alternative, limit the	

State's experts to testifying that the DNA evidence either "matches" or "excludes"

Mr. DeMocker or that the expert cannot form an opinion from a particular sample.

This motion is supported by the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

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SUPERIOR COURT YAYAPAI COUNTY, ARIZONA

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

This Motion comes to this Court with a long history in this case. The Court will well recall that issues with respect to the manner in which DNA results are described was a central issue in the proceedings that led to the first Order of this Court dismissing the indictment and remanding this case for a new finding of probable cause. It remained an issue, although not one resulting in a further remand, after the second grand jury proceeding in 2009. In addition, the language used by forensic witnesses in non-DNA fields also remains an issue. The pending motion to preclude testimony with respect to so-called impression evidence (the shoeprints and tire prints) is the latest example.

Despite the long history of issues involving DNA and forensic testimony in this case, the Motion we are filing today is in many respects premature. As of this date, the State's DNA experts have yet to complete and to report their findings. As a result, the State's experts have yet to be interviewed and we have no final reports revealing how the witnesses might hope to describe their findings. We are filing this motion today in order to remove any eventual question about the continued timeliness of our objections and to assure technical compliance with the 20-day limitations under Rule 16.

The language an expert uses to describe the results of DNA testing can have a critical impact on the outcome of the case. Members of juries tend to place great weight on the testimony of experts and even more so where the expert testimony is scientific in nature. Arizona courts "have previously noted that "science' is often accepted in our society as synonymous with truth." *Bible,* 175 Ariz. at 578, 858 P.2d at 1181 (quoting Morris K. Udall, et al., *Arizona Practice: Law of Evidence* § 102, at 212 (3d ed.1991)). This is particularly so in the case of DNA evidence, which has the potential to dominate a factfinder's thinking." *State v. Lehr*, 201 Ariz. 509, 518, 38 P.3d 1172, 1181 (2002). This tendency has become known as the "CSI effect."

The seriousness of this problem has been recognized by the country's leading forensic science experts. In 2009, after over two and half years of study and research, the National Academy released an exhaustive and fully documented report entitled "Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward." National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States (The National Academies Press 2009) (hereafter the "NAS Report") (hereafter the "NAS Report"). The Report details serious flaws in the scientific reliability and reporting of forensic testing and suggests sweeping reform. The Report states that "if the scientific evidence carries a false sense of significance ... the jury or court can be misled, and this could lead to wrongful conviction or exoneration. If juries lose confidence in the reliability of forensic testimony, valid evidence might be discounted, and some innocent persons might be convicted or guilty individuals acquitted." See NAS Report at 37.

The use of terms such as "inconclusive," "consistent with, or "cannot exclude" are potentially incredibly misleading to laypeople. Inconclusive can mean that there was not enough DNA from which results can be drawn. It can also signify that there were matches at some points and no data for others. Or it could even reflect that there are nonmatches at several points that the expert hypothesizes is due to the dropout of an allele or to some other artifact. The same can be said terms like "consistent with" and "cannot exclude." All of these terms are susceptible to varying interpretations and, therefore, are unsuited for testimony in a capital case.

In one recent study specifically analyzing the impact of variances in language on the relative importance of the evidence inferred by jurors, the authors found:

Clearly, the language employed by forensic experts affects the inferences fact finders draw, sometimes producing conclusions in the minds of fact finders quite different from what the expert witnesses purportedly intend. More subtly, even slight variations in how an expert's testimony is structured or the words used can significantly affect the understanding fact finders' draw from it. And, unfortunately, cross-examination and the use of opposing experts do not appear to

effectively counter expert testimony, regardless of the logical vulnerability of the initial expert testimony.

Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, Communicating Opinion

Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact, 59 Hastings

L.J. 1159, 1189 (2008).

For precisely this reason the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that it was prejudicial for the trial court to admit testimony regarding inconclusive DNA evidence. According to the Court, "[t]he testimony regarding inconclusive DNA evidence, when phrased as it was here, was, at a minimum, prejudicial. It suggested to the jury that Nesbitt and Brault were linked to the blood (after all, they "couldn't be excluded" as potential matches)." *Com. v. Nesbitt*, 452 Mass. 236, 253-254 (2008) (where DNA evidence was insufficient to provide results). The Court determined that "for inconclusive DNA evidence to be admissible, it must be probative of an issue of consequence in the case." *Id.* A Texas court took the same position. When the appellant argued that the trial court had incorrectly determined that appellant's post-conviction DNA test results were not favorable, the Court of Appeals upheld the finding of the lower court. The Court of Appeals found that inconclusive DNA results are not likely admissible because they are not relevant. *Baggett v. State*, 110 S.W.3d 704, 707 (Tex. App. 2003). The Court stated:

Only "relevant" evidence is admissible at trial. Tex.R. Evid. 402 (Vernon Supp.2002). "Relevant evidence" is defined as evidence having "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." *Id.* at 401. Here, the evidence is "inconclusive"; thus, it does not make "more or less probable" the fact that appellant was the source of male pattern DNA found in D.F.

Id. Similarly, any "inconclusive" DNA results in this case are not relevant to whether Mr. DeMocker killed the victim, but because of the multiple interpretations this term is subject to, allowing the jurors to hear that evidence is "inconclusive" will unduly prejudice Mr. DeMocker while not providing any probative value.

Furthermore, because testimony regarding "inconclusive" results is not relevant, it is not admissible pursuant to Rule 702. Rule 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Ariz. R. Evid. 702. "Inconsistent" results that can neither link Mr. DeMocker to the crime nor exclude him do not assist the trier of fact in any way and, therefore, are inadmissible.

Conclusion

Juries tend to have difficulty comprehending the details of STR and Y-STR DNA analysis. Instead, juries tend to want to rely on strong scientific evidence to support their impressions and conclusions about the guilt of the accused. In this case, the jury should be told that to whatever extent biological evidence has been found, that evidence excludes Steven DeMocker or the expert is able to form no opinion from the results. The court has the power to either exclude testimony regarding "inconclusive" DNA results or to require experts to restrict their testimony to language calculated not to result in prejudice. The inconsistent use of phrases such as "inconclusive," "could not eliminate," or "could not exclude," are all fraught with potential to mislead and misinform a jury. With this in mind, Mr. DeMocker requests that this Court issue an order requiring that all DNA experts testify that test results "match" Mr. DeMocker, "exclude" Mr. DeMocker or that the expert testify that he or she can form no opinion.

Once we have the latest DNA results, we will be in a position to advise the Court, first, of what circumstances would warrant preclusion or some other sanction for late disclosure. Once we have interviewed the DPS and Sorenson expert witnesses we will be in a position to move with more specificity to exclude particular testimony proposed by the State. It is also important to note at this stage that it is possible that

the State will attempt to argue other inferences from the DNA results that may also be unwarranted by any scientific support, such as the suggestion that the complete male profile (Item 603) found under the victim's left hand fingernails could have been the result of incidental contact (so-called "touch" DNA) or that the DNA could have been placed there during the autopsy by the negligent use of contaminated nail clippers. At this juncture, we do not know what opinions the State's witnesses might wish to present, but we anticipate that any such testimony would also become the subject of motions to exclude or limit the testimony of the State's witnesses. DATED this 13th day of April, 2010. By: John M. Sears P.O. Box 4080 Prescott, Arizona 86302 OSBORN MALEDON, P.A. Larry A. Hammond Anne M. Chapman 2929 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2100 Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2793 Attorneys for Defendant ORIGINAL of the foregoing hand delivered for filing this 13th day of April, 2010, with: Jeanne Hicks Clerk of the Court Yavapai County Superior Court 120 S. Cortez Prescott, AZ 86303 **COPIES** of the foregoing hand delivered this 13th day of April, 2010, to: The Hon. Thomas B. Lindberg Judge of the Superior Court **Division Six** 120 S. Cortez

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